You could call this the formal beginning of a new Cold War between India and the United States.
Former U.S. President Donald Trump has made it clear: if Apple moves production to India, its products will face a 25% tariff in the U.S. Trump has publicly opposed the ‘Make in India’ initiative, despite once proclaiming “I love India” and showcasing a friendly rapport with Prime Minister Narendra Modi.
So what changed?
To understand the roots of this rift, we must go back to 1972. Back then, the U.S. had a small population and was the first choice for global industries. However, labor was scarce and expensive. Meanwhile, U.S.-India relations had deteriorated. In a strategic pivot, the U.S. aligned with China and encouraged American companies to shift production there, drawn by cheap labor. This move immensely benefited U.S. corporations and transformed China’s economy and workforce. Today, China is a global powerhouse—ironically, a source of regret for the U.S.
Now, the U.S. faces increasing unemployment, and the population has grown. The government wants companies like Apple to relocate from China back to America. But businesses, always driven by profit, recognize that India now offers cheap and scalable labor. For the U.S., these corporations have become problematic—more loyal to profits than national interests.
There’s a growing fear in Washington: that empowering India could repeat the “China mistake”—creating another powerful rival. As a result, India must brace itself. Regardless of whether Trump or Biden is in office, the U.S. will continue to be wary of India’s rise.
Some see Trump as more transparent in his aggression, while Biden’s administration has been subtler yet equally harsh. Take, for instance, Rahul Gandhi’s controversial statement in the U.S. in September 2024, claiming, “Sikhs in India aren’t allowed to wear turbans and are beaten.” Anyone familiar with India knows this is false. The timing was not coincidental—it coincided with increasing diplomatic pressure from the U.S. and Canada on India.
Attempts were even made to destabilize India’s government, echoing the West’s past regime-change efforts in countries like Iraq. Deals like Adani’s in Kenya were scuttled, which would have extended India’s reach in Africa. The Hindenburg report and the sudden media attention on Indian companies were not isolated incidents—they formed a pattern.
Interestingly, American criticism of Indian billionaires coincided with similar attacks from Rahul Gandhi. Was this mere coincidence? Or an orchestrated strategy? These actions also fueled unrest and division within India, potentially escalating into internal conflict.
In response, institutions like the Enforcement Directorate cracked down—such as the National Herald case—to keep things in check.
Rahul Gandhi might be contained, but the underlying resentment of American policymakers toward India’s growing influence will persist. The U.S. wants to ensure that no other country, especially India, challenges its global dominance.
What India needs now is awareness—both political and economic. We must avoid internal divisions, steer clear of communal unrest, and continue building strong industries. We should demand opportunities to create businesses rather than merely seeking government jobs. As India becomes more self-reliant, it won’t matter whether Trump or Biden is in power.
